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I. INTRODUCTION
Occasionally, inquiring into the most obscure, abstract, and ap-
parently inconsequential matters can lead to results of unexpected
practical significance. For example, theoretical tinkering by scien-
tists with the apparently sterile problem of "black body radiation"
led to a revolution in twentieth century physics that significantly
changed the way many scientists think of the world,' and allowed
the development of laser, transistor, and microchip technology.2
Unfortunately, no such technological harvest can be expected
from even the most inspired reflections on constitutional theory.
But the rewards of exploring certain obscure issues in constitu-
tional law may be surprising. This Article argues that a deeper
understanding of our Constitution may flow from some new think-
ing about the possible limits on its amendability. Exploring the
question of whether a constitutional amendment could itself be un-
constitutional may reward us with a better appreciation of the
Constitution itself.
This Article focuses on the possible substantive unconstitution-
ality of purported constitutional amendments. It does not consider
unconstitutionality for failure to comply with the procedural
requirements article V of the Constitution imposes on the amend-
ment process. This Article devotes little attention to the pro-
cedural side of the claim that an amendment depriving a state of its
equal suffrage in the Senate would be unconstitutional unless en-
acted with the consent of that state.' Rather, the focus here is
* Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.
1. See THE GHOST IN THE ATOM 2-4 (P. Davis & J. Brown eds. 1986); N. HERBERT,
QUANTUM REALITY: BEYOND THE NEW PHYSICS 34-35 (1985); H. PAGELS, THE COS-
MIC CODE: QUANTUM PHYSICS AS THE LANGUAGE OF NATURE 26, 66-67 (1982); J.
POLKINGHORNE, THE QUANTUM WORLD 5 (1984).
2. See THE GHOST IN THE ATOM, supra note 1, at 4; H. PAGELS, supra note 1, at 40,
49, 98.
3. The language in article V prohibiting this sort of amendment may be treated as
either a unique and express limitation on the substance of the amending power, or as a
procedural limitation, in that the restriction may be overridden with the consent of any
adversely affected state. See U.S. CONST. art. V. See generally Lindner, What in the
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upon what might be referred to as implied limitations on the sub-
stance of constitutional amendments.
It is hoped that the usefulness of this inquiry will transcend the
number of amendments that actually have been held unconstitu-
tional on substantive grounds. Arguments for the substantive un-
constitutionality of procedurally valid amendments rarely have
been presented to the Supreme Court. They uniformly, and almost
summarily, have been rejected.4 The mainstream position remains
that "no limitations on substance have yet been found, and it is
unlikely that any will ever be found."5
Nonetheless, " '[o]ne of the most important subjects that can en-
gage the attention of the.., people of this country is the extent and
scope of the power to amend the Constitution of the United
States.' "6 This is largely because "[w]hen we answer the question
as to what we can never do constitutionally, we have gone a long
way toward clarifying the American conception of constitutional-
ism. ' Although this Article will reject the most commonly pro-
posed substantive limitations on the amending power, it
nonetheless will derive certain implied substantive limits from the
ascertainable presuppositions and purposes underlying our Consti-
tution, and perhaps all constitutions.
The Article will conclude that implied substantive limitations on
constitutional amendments exist even absent any particular "es-
sence" or overriding spirit that informs the whole Constitution.
Neither does this theory of implied substantive limits depend upon
Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 ARIz. L. REV. 717, 717 (198 1)(stating that only a
few Americans think that the guarantee of equal Senate suffrage is the only part of the
Constitution expressly unamendable under the Constitution's own terms).
4. See, e.g., Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136 (1922) (rejecting the claim that the
nineteenth amendment, which extended the franchise to women, was in substance uncon-
stitutional on states' rights grounds, or as an excessive impairment of the autonomy of
any unconsenting state because the nineteenth amendment was in this regard no more of
an intrusion on states' rights than the fifteenth amendment, the constitutionality of which
had been long recognized). See also National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920)
(offering only an utterly conclusory and rejection of the assertion that the eighteenth
amendment, establishing Prohibition, was substantively outside the scope of the article V
amending power). Justice Clarke dissented in part but concurred without further elucida-
tion on this issue. See id. at 407 (Clarke, J., dissenting). Of course, the theory developed
in this Article does not begin to suggest that either of these cases reached an incorrect
result.
5. L. ORFIELD, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 23, 106-26
(1942).
6. Orfield, The Scope of the Federal Amending Power, 28 MICH. L. REV. 550, 550 n. 1
(1930) (quoting 2 G. CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (OF THE UNITED STATES) 152
(1896)).
7. Lindner, supra note 3, at 718.
[Vol. 22
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments?
excessive devotion to the views of the framers or upon any claim
that constitutional interpreters must answer to a "higher" or natu-
ral law. Rather, implied limits on the substance of constitutional
amendments flow from the inescapable logic of any reasonable
view of the basic purposes underlying the Constitution, and from
the requirement that a constitution exist as a minimally unified,
coherent, functioning document.
II. PRESUPPOSITION AND PURPOSE IN MODERN
CONSTITUTION-MAKING
Modem constitution-making tends to be a purposive undertak-
ing. Although there may be more to modem constitutions than the
achievement of certain purposes, the element of purpose is almost
always present. Constitutions certainly may have more than one
purpose. One or more such purposes may be difficult to articulate,
and they may also not be shared universally. The purposes may be
instrumental or merely expressive. Furthermore, the purposes un-
derlying a constitution may change over time.
This sense of coherent, ascertainable purpose pervades modem
constitutionalism. For writers in the social contract vein, the pur-
poses of the constitution must parallel the people's purposes for
entering into the social contract or into political society. What is
surprising is not that modem constitutional theory tends to refer to
purpose, but that various theorists tend to share substantially the
particular purposes identified.
A remarkable range of the most influential theorists have em-
phasized the aim of sheer personal security or safety in their ac-
counts of why persons establish a society, or a particular
constitution. Thomas Hobbes emphasized personal security and
cultural development as the motivations or purposes for instituting
civil government.' Hobbes' more republican colleague, Benedict
Spinoza, later concluded that "the ultimate aim of government is
... to free every man from fear, that he may live in all possible
security." 9
This constitutional emphasis on achieving peace and safety is
not a mere passing historical fashion. James Harrington's The
Commonwealth of Oceana provided political equality for the sake
of "domestic peace and tranquility."' 10 John Locke, in his Second
8. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (M. Oakshott ed. 1962).
9. B. SPINOZA, A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE 258-59 (R. Elwes trans. 1951).
10. J. HARRINGTON, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 70 (C.
Blitzer ed. 1955).
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Treatise of Government, similarly viewed entering into political so-
ciety as a necessary means of preserving life, liberty, and property
from the "fears and continual dangers""I of the state of nature.
Closer to the American Revolution, David Hume saw the estab-
lishment of political society as being purpose-driven "to administer
justice." 12 Hume instrumentally justified this as necessary for pub-
lic peace, safety, and mutual intercourse.'I Contemporaneously
with the enactment of the American Constitution, the French phi-
losopher Condorcet made central to his account of the "rights of
man" 14 those of "[s]ecurity of person"' 5 and "[s]ecurity and free
enjoyment of property."16
This is not to suggest that traditional liberal constitutionalism is
preoccupied exclusively with safety and security. Although Rous-
seau, for example, was concerned with finding a basic mechanism
for protecting and defending "the person and property"' 7 of each
member of society, he also wanted each person to "remain as free
as before."'" Condorcet recognized not merely freedom generally,
but liberty of the press, as established under the American Consti-
tution, to be "one of the most sacred rights of humanity."' 9 Even
more interestingly, Montesquieu referred to England as the "[o]ne
nation ... in the world that has for the direct end of its constitu-
tion political liberty."'20
Among others, one might list as the central constitutional aims
equality in the distribution of whatever rights are constitutionally
recognized,2' the recognition and pursuit of "the common good of
the society, ' ' 22 and the attainment or preservation of popular sover-
11. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 368 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963).
12. DAVID HUME'S POLITICAL ESSAYS 39 (C. Hendel ed. 1953).
13. See id.
14. CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS 73 (K. Baker ed. 1976).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT bk. I, ch. VI, at 17 (L. Crocker ed. 1967).
18. Id. at 18.
19. CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 14, at 78.
20. B. DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (T. Nugent trans. 1949).
Intriguingly, though, Montesquieu goes on to define political liberty precisely in terms of
safety, absence of fear, and tranquility of mind. See id. at 183-87.
21. See, e.g., CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 14, at 221. Political
equality partly for instrumental reasons, as well as for its own sake, or as mandated by
justice, might be equally desirable.
22. Sunstein, Constitutions and Democracies: An Epilogue, in CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND DEMOCRACY 331 (J. Elster & R. Slagstad eds. 1988) (discussing the views of Alex-
ander Hamilton that every political constitution ought first to obtain for rulers people
who "possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of
society.").
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eignty.23 Related is the concept that obtaining the consent of the
governed is essential to legitimate government.24 Obtaining the
consent of the governed in turn may be instrumental not only to
maintain political peace and stability, but to recognizing and ad-
vancing human dignity.25
Regardless of which of these aims constitutions in general, or
our Constitution in particular, most strongly emphasize, constitu-
tion-making is ordinarily a purpose-driven activity. These pur-
poses are themselves based upon certain presuppositions or
assumptions about moral values, human nature, or the way the
world works. Some of these presuppositions can be identified with
reasonable precision. For example, the moral necessity of the con-
sent of the governed inevitably presupposes the possibility of valid,
meaningful consent by persons competent to consent. 26 In the ab-
sence of this capacity, a consent requirement aimed at furthering
human dignity would be meaningless.
Another less obvious but widely recognized presupposition
thought to underlie the Constitution is the belief that at least some
constitutional rights are inalienable. Writers such as Hobbes,27
Spinoza, 2s and Condorcet 29 recognized the inalienability, or non-
waivability, of certain rights often thought to be essential elements
of American constitutionalism. 3 Unfortunately, the notion of the
23. See, e.g., Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Arti-
cle V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1103 n. 211 (1988) (viewing popular sovereignty as the
"true essence" of the Constitution).
24. See, e.g., G. CASPER, CONSTITUTIONALISM 4 (Occasional Papers from the Law
School, University of Chicago No. 22, 1987); Vile, Limitations on the Constitutional
Amending Process, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 373, 374 (1985) ("[i]n declaring indepen-
dence, the American colonists asserted that governments rest upon 'the consent of the
governed' ") (quoting The Declaration of Independence para. I (U.S. 1776)).
25. See generally Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV.
703, 704-08, 745 (1980) (The United States Constitution includes a tradition of values as
important as those expressed in the document itself-human dignity, for example.).
26. See, e.g., Davis v. Police Jury, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 280, 287 (1850) (competency test
applied to contract whereby Spanish government of Louisiana had granted exclusive
ferry rights to an individual).
27. See T. HOBBES, supra note 8, at 105 (right of self-defense is inalienable because no
good to the person purportedly alienating such right can arise from that alienation).
28. See B. SPINOZA, supra note 9, at 257 (natural rights, including that of "free rea-
son and judgment," are not subject to abdication even by consent).
29. See CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 14, at 222 (one cannot bind
oneself to obey a majority that has once recognized, but now violates, the rights of the
individual).
30. See Abbot, Inalienable Rights and the Eighteenth Amendment, 20 COLUM. L.
REV. 183, 183-85 (1920); Amar, supra note 23, at 1050 (discussing the inalienable right to
alter or abolish a particular form of government); White, Is There an Eighteenth Amend-
ment?, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 113, 122 (1920). Justice Stevens has argued for "liberty" as an
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inalienability of certain constitutional rights tends to complicate,
rather than resolve, the issue of the implied substantive unconstitu-
tionality of particular constitutional amendments.
This complication arises because it is unclear what principles
should be inferred from the text or even from the legislative history
of an amendment repealing a putatively inalienable right. The re-
pealing amendment may amount to an informed, conscientious,
collective change of mind not about merely the value of the right
itself, but about its inalienability as well. It is hardly clear why a
collective decision in the past that a right is inalienable must con-
trol a current collective decision that it is not inalienable. 3 A col-
lective change of mind about the inalienability of a right does not
necessarily require starting from scratch with a new constitution.
This Article does not assume that an amendment repealing a "gen-
uinely" inalienable right therefore simply must be unjustifiable on
the merits or contrary to natural law, and hence also invalid as a
matter of constitutional law.
On the other hand, such a repealing amendment, at least in ex-
treme cases, may call its own constitutionality into question if it
casts a broad and deep shadow on much of the remainder of the
Constitution. If one assumes that much of the Constitution neces-
sarily is inspired by some inalienable rights theory, and given that
the amendment in question can only be interpreted as implicitly
repudiating the whole idea of inalienable rights, it may be impossi-
ble to give effect to the amendment only to the extent that it repeals
a particular designated right. The logic of the Constitution would
call into question the ability of the amendment to co-exist compati-
bly with what the amendment is supposed to amend-the remain-
inalienable right. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). For a general argument against the constitutional application of the notion of ina-
lienable rights, see McGovney, Is the Eighteenth Amendment Void Because of its
Contents?, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 499, 500-02 (1920). For a sophisticated discussion of the
legitimate role of inalienability in the constitutional context, see Holmes, Precommitment
and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note
22, at 238-40 (a modem constitution forecloses certain options, like self enslavement).
For broader discussions of the possible rationales for inalienability rules largely apart
from a constitutional context, but within a property rights context, see Calabresi & Me-
lamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111-13 (1972); Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 970 (1985); Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985).
31. For a sense of some of the complications, see, e.g., T. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND
CONSEQUENCE 57-58 (1984). But cf. Vile, supra note 24, at 387 ("one generation should
have the right to say that the next generation must choose to follow the forms it has
specified or choose another system") (emphasis in original).
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ing, unrepealed body of the Constitution. Logically, an"amendment" cannot amend if it renders a constitution un-
recognizable, disrupts its continuity or identity, makes it meaning-
less, or merely inevitably and deeply conflicts with the constitution
on which it is to be engrafted.
This is not a matter of obscure metaphysics, but of common ex-
perience. The practice of medicine suggests that transplanted tis-
sue, or an "amendment" to the body, provoking an allergic
reaction beyond some degree of severity and extent cannot in any
real sense be considered a genuine, functioning, actual transplant.
It is so incompatible with the body to which it is grafted that the
transplant and body do not form a unified, coherent, functioning
whole. Doctors may be able to salvage, perhaps, either the trans-
planted tissue itself or the remainder of the body. But both cannot
survive as a coherent unified working entity. Therefore, the result
is a non-functioning transplant. So too it goes with constitutions.
This does not suggest that there cannot be a genuinely important
change through "mere" constitutional amendment. There is, how-
ever, a difference between amending a constitution and starting
fresh. An amendment need not in any sense be compatible with
what it expressly or implicitly repeals, or all that remains, but it
plainly must be compatible with some sufficient portion of the re-
maining constitution. If, however, the putative amendment ren-
ders incomprehensible so much of the established constitution that
the amendment and the remaining portions of the constitution to-
gether do not form a viable and complete constitution, then the
amendment can be validly enacted as only a part of what is really a
new constitution.32
32. Cf Skinner, Intrinsic Limitations on the Power of Constitutional Amendment, 18
MICH. L. REV. 213, 221 (1920) (Unless held above every other power in the Constitution,
the power of amendment is incapable of withdrawing any power the Constitution
grants.). One of the closer approaches to this view found in the literature is Professor
Skinner's recognition in 1920 of the argument that the states are not authorized or em-
powered under the amendment clause to "subvert the structure, spirit and theory" of the
Constitution. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2992-93 (1864).) The
focus here is not on what may or may not be done through the amendment clause with-
out exceeding the limits on what the states are authorized to do through the amendment
process. Nor is the focus here on the claim that a putative constitutional amendment
may itself be unconstitutional because it violates some prior understanding or instruction.
The amendment may be precisely a repudiation of just this prior understanding or in-
struction. Instead, the focus is on the claim that the amendment, together with the re-
maining portions of the Constitution, do not together form a sufficient, intelligible,
workable unity. The argument here is that an amendment may be unconstitutional not
because it is improper or unauthorized, but because as a matter of logic it triggers the
need for a fresh constitutional start without acknowledging that fact. More simply, an"amendment" may be unconstitutional if it purports to be a mere amendment while by
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III. HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENTS FOR THE
SUBSTANTIVE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF PARTICULAR
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Several writers have attempted to show that particular types of
constitutional amendments are unconstitutional.33 In the early
part of the twentieth century, most such attempts focused on
amendments allegedly treading unduly on the rights and powers of
the states. More recently, the attempts have shifted to amend-
ments impairing basic individual rights. Unfortunately, none of
these broad attempts to show unconstitutionality have been
convincing.
The early efforts based on state police powers or state sover-
eignty tended to begin with the uncontroversial premise that article
V of the United States Constitution literally prohibits the denial of
equal representation in the Senate to any unconsenting state.34
Some writers infer from this that no state can be destroyed or abol-
ished without its consent. 35 The further inference arises that any
constitutional amendment depriving an unconsenting state of its
36 oflegislative powers, or some of its legislative powers, or altering
the composition of a state,38 must itself be unconstitutional.
There certainly is force in the claim that one cannot merely cir-
cumvent constitutional restrictions, or do indirectly what is barred
directly. Nonetheless, the purported states' rights or state sover-
eignty restriction on constitutional amendments ultimately is inef-
fective. First, and perhaps most surprisingly, an amendment
abolishing the states would not necessarily violate the right of any
unconsenting state to equal Senate suffrage. If all the states were
abolished, each state would then have equal, or zero, representa-
tion in the Senate. 39 If but one or a few states were abolished, how-
ever, it might still be possible to interpret article V as only
protecting the equal Senate suffrage of states that continue to ex-
implication actually calling so much of the purportedly intact remainder of the Constitu-
tion into question as to leave only a fragmentary, schizophrenic, or inevitably confused
residue. This is a matter not of legitimacy, or of keeping faith with our ancestors, but of
logic.
33. See infra notes 34-77 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Machen, Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void?, 23 HARV. L. REV. 169, 173
(1910); Marbury, The Limitations upon the Amending Power, 33 HARV. L. REV. 223, 229
(1920).
35. See, e.g., Machen, supra note 34, at 173.
36. See, e.g., Marbury, supra note 34, at 229; White, supra note 30, at 114-15.
37. See, e.g., Marbury, supra note 34, at 228; White, supra note 30, at 115.
38. See Machen, supra note 34, at 174-78, 186.
39. See L. ORFIELD, supra note 5, at 97-98.
[Vol. 22
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments?
istY° Under this interpretation, abolishing one or more states
would not violate article V.
More significantly, however, no constitutional amendment can
simply abolish one or more states. The amendment, in its histori-
cal context if not by its own language, inevitably must leave some-
thing in place of the states if the inhabitants of the abolished states
are not to be expelled from the Union. To abolish one or more
states, of necessity, is to adopt or allow some sort of alternative
government for the residents of those states. Abolishing the states
need not even be a profoundly radical political change"' if, for ex-
ample, the states were replaced by county or broad regional gov-
ernmental structures with state-like authority.
Neither does it follow, as a matter of the logic of policy, that
equal Senate suffrage requires that the states continue to exist, or to
exist unmodified. The equal Senate suffrage rule may have had a
particular purpose or purposes that abolition of the states would
not necessarily impair. If, for example, one assumes that the
smaller states insisted upon equal Senate suffrage as a means of
avoiding political exploitation by larger, more populous states,42
then abolishing all the states may not violate that purpose behind
the equal Senate suffrage requirement. An invidious, tyrannical
purpose motivating a denial of equal Senate suffrage to a small
state may be utterly absent from an amendment abolishing some or
all the states, or an amendment abolishing the Senate itself.4 3
It is also useful to remember that the very process of constitu-
tional amendment ensures that a decisive role in the enactment
process will be held by the states themselves, or by those subject to
the continuing political influence of the states." Ordinarily, the
states are capable of protecting their own basic interests through
the political process, at least to a greater extent than individual
speakers seeking to express unpopular, dissenting points of view. 45
40. Cf id. at 97 (stating that article V is confined "is confined to protecting the equal-
ity of the states in the Senate").
41. But cf id. at 90 (noting that the parts of the Constitution which divide state and
federal powers are fundamental).
42. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 574 (1964) (discussing the adoption of the
equal Senate suffrage rule to avoid deadlock between the states at the Constitutional
Convention).
43. Cf L. ORFIELD, supra note 5, at 96-98; Orfield, supra note 6, at 577-78 (both
expressing the view that the Senate may be abolished constitutionally).
44. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-52 (1985),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 889 (1988) (recognizing of the ability of the states to exercise signifi-
cant political control over their fate at the federal level).
45. See id.; see also Frierson, Amending the Constitution of the United States, 33
HARV. L. REV. 659, 660 (1920).
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Thus, any reduction of the states' legislative powers generally, let
alone their abolition as states, will tend in practice to be largely
voluntary.46
This sort of argument provides no guarantee that, for example,
the vast majority of states will not rudely gang up on an isolated
state and abolish it in a procedurally legitimate way. On balance,
however, it seems soundest not to view the constitutional amend-
ment effecting this change as itself substantively unconstitutional,
whatever its motive or practical impact. The Constitution before
and after this amendment would still be a recognizable and viable
constitution, with a continuity of identity that persists in the face
of change." Admittedly, this represents in part a value judgment
regarding precisely what sorts of things are most reflective of the
purposes underlying the Constitution and most indispensable to
our governmental scheme.
Historically, a consensus has existed on personal safety and se-
curity, together with values such as cultural development, liberty,
equality, dignity, and consent, as fundamental political and consti-
tutional purposes. 48 As an example, a comparison of the abolition
of one or a few states with the adoption of the Civil War era
amendments reveals that the Civil War era amendments worked a
further reaching reinterpretation or restatement of the basic consti-
tutional purposes than amendments abolishing states likely would.
Bluntly put, the adoption of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fif-
teenth amendments was of greater constitutional significance than
any abolition of one or more states is likely to be, at least unless
that abolition itself affects the same values underlying the Civil
War amendments. The continued existence of all the states is
largely of instrumental importance. Despite some past argument
to the contrary,4 9 the Civil War amendments represent a constitu-
tionally valid recognition and enhancement of the basic values un-
derlying modern constitution making. This is true regardless of
their restrictions on state governmental power. Apart from any
46. But cf. Marbury, supra note 34, at 224, 228-29 (arguing that once some legislative
power is taken from the states by an amendment, all legislative powers eventually may be
taken away).
47. Cf D. PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS, 199-377 (1984); Perry, The Importance
of Being Identical, in THE IDENTITIES OF PERSONS 89 (A. Rorty ed. 1976) (containing
philosophical discussions of the continuity of personal identity that, by analogy, are at
least compatible with this analysis).
48. See supra notes 8-25 and accompanying text.
49. See generally Machen, supra note 34, at 1, 192 n. 1 (viewing the fifteenth amend-
ment as an abuse of power valid only if its application were confined to federal elections,
or possibly to persons acquiring the right to vote under state laws).
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effects on values protected by entirely separate constitutional pro-
visions and amendments, abolition of one or a few states cannot
work a comparably significant constitutional change for good or ill.
The abolition of one or several states, without more, does not cru-
cially affect the recognizable core constitutional purposes or values.
Such abolition does not cast uncertainty on, undermine, conflict
with, or render meaningless, any purpose-based portion of the
Constitution sufficient to render the amended Constitution invalid.
Because abolition of states generally would not undermine the
Constitution, a states'-rights-based approach could not convinc-
ingly generate substantive limitations on constitutional amend-
ments. Surprisingly, the more contemporary individual-rights-
based approaches often fare no better in limiting amendments. Se-
rious problems beset each of the individual rights-based attempts at
substantive limitation.
One very interesting individual-rights-based attempt is Professor
Amar's suggestion that "[a]n amendment abolishing free speech
might ... be unconstitutional"50 even though adopted in a proce-
durally valid manner. Professor Amar's theory is that this sort of
amendment impliedly would be unconstitutional, as it "would ef-
fectively immunize the status quo from further constitutional revi-
sion, in violation of the non-entrenchment component of
neutrality." 5' Professor Amar's point, however, need not be deci-
sive. Assume a set of rational constitutional framers who were
proud of their work. They believed that the Constitution as
drafted, subject to a certain flexibility of interpretation, adequately
protected basic constitutional values. Arguably, it would not have
been inconceivable for these hypothesized framers to consider that
later generations might decline to use, or even abolish, the amend-
ment process outlined in article V. Such a set of framers would not
necessarily seek to lock in the then-current constitutional judgment
in perpetuity. The framers could have intended merely less "neu-
trality," and a greater bias in favor of the constitutional status quo,
than Professor Amar assumes. The framers might have preferred
that sweeping changes in the elements underlying the Constitution
take place not through constitutional amendment, but through the
discontinuous process of rejecting the established constitution and
enacting a new one.
These hypothetical framers would not necessarily have objected
to a constitutional amendment that restricts or abolishes freedom
50. Amar, supra note 23, at 1045 n.I.
51. Id.
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of speech insofar as such speech is addressed to the merits of con-
stitutional amendments radically changing the basic constitutional
values. Nothing need be constitutionally amiss with constitutional
non-neutrality, in the sense that significant changes in basic consti-
tutional values are to be undertaken not by amendment, but by
repudiation of the old constitution and enactment of a
replacement.
Interestingly, though, Professor Amar refers to the idea of "abo-
lition of speech."'5 2 Literally, this implies much more than either a
simple repeal of the free speech and press clauses, or a prohibition
on speech addressing constitutional amendments. The constitu-
tional consequences of such an amendment essentially prohibiting
political speech would be hard to confine. It might well itself be
substantively unconstitutional on our approach. It might conflict
with so much of what is apparently crucial in the remaining por-
tions of the Constitution that it requires a choice between retaining
the unamended Constitution, or using the putative amendment as
the nucleus for an entirely new, internally consistent Constitution.
Without substantial quantities of political speech by members of
the general public, it is difficult to understand a number of crucial,
indispensable provisions of the Constitution. Provisions affected
would include the sections that require public election of members
of the House of Representatives, 53 those that describe the process
of electing a president, 54 and those that guarantee to each state a
republican form of government." Also affected would be much of
the remainder of the first amendment, including the right "peacea-
bly to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. '" '56 It is fair to say that an amendment barring most
political speech by the general public inevitably would undermine
or render meaningless much of what is necessary to our current
understanding of the Constitution. It would leave standing only a
disjointed, unworkably insufficient, fragmentary constitutional
structure. To enact such an "amendment" necessarily commits
one constitutionally to starting over. This conclusion illustrates
the paradox of the free speech clause in our Constitution. Free
speech is both of vital importance and arguably largely superflu-
ous, because it is implied by much of the rest of the Constitution.5 7
52. See id.
53. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
54. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2-4.
55. See id. art. IV, § 4.
56. Id. amend. I.
57. See, e.g., R. MORGAN, JAMES MADISON ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BILL
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If some degree of political speech must remain to ensure any
recognizable continuity of identity in the federal Constitution,
must any other particular values similarly be upheld lest the
amended Constitution descend into a morass of contradiction?
Professor Walter Murphy argues that "[t]he basic value in the
United States Constitution, broadly conceived, has become a con-
cern for human dignity.""8  Professor Murphy postulates that
human dignity is simultaneously the "fundamental value in the
American polity"59 and the root of constitutionalism itself.60 The
dignity, or inherent worth, of the individual reflects our capacity
for responsibility and autonomy.6'
Although the underlying ideas of moral responsibility and au-
tonomy today may be controversial, Professor Murphy must face
the ultimate objection that to the degree we give precise concrete
content to the idea of human dignity,62 we necessarily begin to lose
confidence in its unquestionable constitutional status. Obviously,
it would be foolish and implausible to argue against the vital moral
centrality of protecting and furthering human dignity on all fronts.
But in the debate over at least some important legal policy matters,
more than one side can at least initially claim the support of some
conception of human dignity. 63 Once the concept of human dig-
nity is sufficiently definite to be constitutionally useful, however, it
is no longer clear why an amendment must be unconstitutional if,
for example, it limits the protection or advancement of one concep-
tion of human dignity for the sake of some other equally plausible
conception of human dignity, or even for the sake of genuine de-
OF RIGHTS 174 (Contributions in Legal Studies No. 48, 1988) (noting the controversial
view at the time of enactment that the Constitution conferred no power to suppress free-
dom of speech).
58. Murphy, supra note 25, at 745. But cf Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,
56 (1988) (subordinating the dignity of public figures to free expression unless such ex-
pression involves a reckless disregard for the falsity of a plausible claim of fact about the
public figure plaintiff).
59. Murphy, supra note 25, at 708; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24
(1971) (Justice Harlan noting "the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which
our political system rests").
60. See Murphy, supra note 25, at 729 (quoting Professor Carl Friedrich in C. FRIED-
RICH, LIMITED GOVERNMENT: A COMPARISON 123 (1974)).
61. See Murphy, supra note 25, at 749.
62. See generally Fellman, Principles Other than Human Dignity in Constitutional
Analysis, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 765, 771 (1980) ("[c]onstitutions, which are designed to
endure for ages to come, are worded in vague and general language which invites judicial
interpretation").
63. See Brest, Accommodation of the Majoritarianism and Rights of Human Dignity,
53 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 761-62 (1980) (criticizing Professor Murphy on this point).
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mocracy or national union,' or personal security, or the liberty of
the least advantaged, where these values may occasionally conflict
with the adopted conception of human dignity.
Thus, Professor Murphy's main argument based on the general
concept of human dignity is unsuccessful. However, Professor
Murphy later offers a much more concrete and ultimately challeng-
ing example of an allegedly unconstitutional amendment.
Although Professor Murphy couches his discussion of this hypo-
thetical amendment in terms of human dignity, his invocation of
dignity really does not materially advance the argument. Professor
Murphy refers to the following example:
[A] constitutional amendment whose opening sentence reads:
"Members of the various colored races are inferior to Caucasians
in moral worth." The amendment goes on to limit the franchise
to whites, to require state and federal governments to segregate
public institutions, and to authorize other legal disabilities that
clearly offend, even deny, the human dignity of noncaucasians.65
It is superficially possible to undermine this abomination by ar-
guing for its consistency with the Constitution prior to the Civil
War amendments. Regardless, the constitutionality of this puta-
tive amendment under contemporary circumstances would be du-
bious in the extreme. Actually, this is seen most readily not by
focusing on the obvious conflicts between this amendment and the
Civil War amendments, or any other constitutional provisions.
Rather, to discredit this purported amendment, the most illuminat-
ing course would seem to involve a direct contrast between the
amendment and at least the contemporary understanding of the
basic purposes underlying modem constitutions in general, and the
federal Constitution in particular.66
Obviously, the putative amendment quoted above conflicts fun-
damentally and irreconcilably with virtually all conceptions of the
commonly cited constitutional value of equality.67 Such an amend-
ment could not plausibly be consistent with the constitutional goal
of advancing the common good.68 The amendment simply panders
to the bare perceived advantage of entrenched, relatively powerful
64. See Vile, supra note 24, at 385 (discussing the occasional need for "popular rule"
or "national union" to take priority over the protection of dignity in the course of a
critique of Professor Murphy's approach).
65. Murphy, supra note 25, at 755.
66. See supra notes 8-25 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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69particular groups.
Most interestingly, even those constitutionalists or social con-
tract theorists least noted for their liberal progressivism may offer
reasons to suppose that Professor Murphy's hypothetical amend-
ment is unconstitutional. Thomas Hobbes, for example, exempli-
fies those theorists who emphasize the concerns for safety or
security as primary reasons to enter into political society.7 ° Hob-
bes argued, however, that safety and security, as a matter of the
human condition and human psychology, are tied intimately to the
recognition of equality of basic political rights among citizens.7' In
a classic passage, Hobbes argued the following with cold-eyed
realism:
[n]ature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and
mind; as that . . .when all is reckoned together, the difference
between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man
can thereupon claim ... any benefit, to which another may not
pretend, as well as he. For... the weakest has strength enough
to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confeder-
acy with others, that are in the same danger with himself.72
Hobbes then observed that belief in natural inequality typically
reduces to "a vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all
men think they have in a greater degree, than the vulgar; that is,
than all men but themselves, and a few others . . . ."I Hobbes
concluded that equality of ability naturally generates equality of
hope in the realization of ends, 4 through violence or other means.
Ultimately, the only sensible, stable arrangement upon which to
build a safe and secure peace, given human capacities and human
psychology, is one based on equality of right, or equality of conces-
sion of right, among ordinary citizens.7 5 For the sake of security,
members of a self-governed society must be contented with only as
much liberty to act against or upon other persons as they are will-
ing to concede to others to act against themselves.76
Thus, a cogent argument exists for the unconstitutionality of the
69. For a discussion of the viability of distinguishing between mere group self-interest
and a deliberatively arrived at common good, see generally Sunstein, Naked Preferences
and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984) (stating that many important
clauses of the Constitution protect against a single evil-the distribution of resources or
opportunities to the politically more powerful at the exclusion of the less powerful).
70. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
71. See T. HOBBES, supra note 8, at 98-99.
72. Id. at 98.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 104.
76. See id. (enunciating what Hobbes refers to as the "second law of nature").
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hypothetical example posed by Professor Murphy, but not by a
problematic appeal to dignity." Rather, an argument can be con-
structed by an appeal to the irreconcilability of the putative
amendment with a broad range of basic purposes or values nor-
mally advanced for the initial enactment of a modem constitution.
Such an amendment would create a pragmatic contradiction: if we
adopt Professor Murphy's hypothetical amendment, it is unclear
how to make sense of the rest of the Constitution. Professor Mur-
phy's hypothetical amendment and the rest of the Constitution,
under any familiar interpretation, work at cross-purposes. To
adopt the amendment throws constitutional interpretation into tur-
moil because that amendment implicitly abandons the presumed
reasons for having a constitution in the first place. Adoption of the
amendment does not merely fine-tune or update the institutional
means to protect or realize those purposes. Rather, adoption repu-
diates those purposes whether this initially is appreciated and un-
derstood by the drafters and ratifiers of the amendment or not.
IV. IMPLIED SUBSTANTIVE LIMITS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS: REPLY TO OBJECTIONS
The idea of implied substantive limitations on constitutional
amendments currently is not popular. This unpopularity to some
degree merely reflects the lack of current acceptance of natural law
theory. At least some versions of natural law thinking hold that an
inviolable "higher law" restricts the substance of constitutional
amendments.78 The current and fairly widespread rejection of nat-
ural law, however, precludes this possible source of implied limita-
tions on the substance of constitutional amendments.
Accordingly, the theory of implied substantive limitations on
amendments developed herein does not rely on any recognizable
natural law doctrine. 9 No assumption is made here that any con-
stitutional amendment objectively can be recognized to be morally
wrong and nullified on a natural law basis.
Quite apart from natural law is the intuitive idea that at least
some implied limits exist on the substance of constitutional amend-
ments. This idea is difficult to discard, even before any general
77. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
78. See L. ORFIELD, supra note 5, at 109-10.
79. For a discussion of the idea of natural law in the American legal context, see
generally Rose, The Law of Nature: An Introduction to American Legal Philosophy, 131
OHIO ST. L.J. 121, 159 (1952) (concluding that natural law theory, whether associated
with orthodox Christianity or humanism, attests to the democratic faith that "the actual
does not of necessity exclude the ideal").
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theory of these limits actually is established. Consider, for exam-
ple, the express restriction in article V that states cannot be de-
prived of equal Senate representation without their consent.80
Although, as demonstrated, it is difficult to infer from this that an
amendment abolishing the states or the Senate must itself be un-
constitutional, 81 this is not the only possible inference that limits
the scope of the amendment power in this context.
Consider, for example, a single constitutional amendment that
purports to do two things. First, the amendment repeals the article
V guarantee that states retain equal representation in the Senate, as
of the first day following final ratification of the amendment. Sec-
ond, the amendment provides that each state be represented in the
Senate only in proportion to its population, in a way comparable to
representation in the House of Representatives. The effective date
of the latter portion of the amendment is the second day following
ratification. 2
Assume this two-stage amendment were in fact adopted and
duly ratified, over the vigorous objections of a number of the less
populous states. A strong case could be made that this two-stage
amendment is a procedurally valid constitutional amendment. The
amendment, however, has no detectable purpose other than to cir-
cumvent the requirement that no state be deprived of equal repre-
sentation in the Senate.
This hypothetical should give pause to all those who deny the
possibility of implied substantive limitations on constitutional
amendments. To deny such a possibility comes only at the cost of
allowing a transparent evasion of the express restriction on amend-
ments in article V. If one is prepared to concede that the two-stage
amendment discussed above is impliedly unconstitutional, how-
ever, the door swings open. If there is one implied substantive lim-
itation, there can be others.
One further line of objection suggests that even if the analysis
offered herein does not rely on natural law, it does rely on the idea
of purpose. In particular, it relies on the purposes either of consti-
tutional drafters or ratifiers, or contemporary citizens seeking to
make coherent sense of more than one constitutional provision.
The problem, however, is that ascertaining a collective purpose in a
80. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
82. The problem of evading the purposes of the article V restriction by means of two
separate amendments is noted in W. LIVINGSTON, FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE 238-39 (1956). Arguably, having to enact two separate amendments in succes-
sion affords some degree of special constitutional protection to the less populous states.
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constitutional context is no easy task. 3
Skepticism about the ability to detect with reasonable, if not pre-
cise, accuracy any relevant purposes must not be pushed too far. 4
In daily life, if we were to adopt boundless skepticism about our
ability to detect our own or others' purposes, the results would be
extremely unsatisfactory. 5 A similar, necessary faith in the ability
to detect purposes is warranted in the constitutional context.
Judge Posner has expressed the matter in the following terms:
Even though the hypostatization of "legislative intent" . . . is an
insult to philosophy, statutes and constitutional provisions unde-
niably are purposive utterances. Often the purposes can be dis-
cerned from text and context... and used to answer a question
of interpretation in a way that advances the cooperative enter-
prise set on foot by the enactment.... The proper conception is
knowledge by empathy, not knowledge by mind reading.86
Even those most skeptical of ascertaining collective subjective in-
tent concede enough to make our point. Justice Scalia, for exam-
ple, has argued that "discerning the subjective motivation of those
enacting [a] statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible
task." '87 He nonetheless grants that "it is possible to discern the
objective 'purpose' of a statute (i.e., the public good at which its
provisions appear to be directed), or even the formal motivation for
a statute where that is explicitly set forth." 88
As for the Constitution, the very presence of the preamble is
inexplicable unless the framers envisioned the Constitution as a
purposive enterprise.89 This does not suggest that each framer was
83. See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L.
REV. 204, 204 (1980); Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 659-60 (1987);
Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation
Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482, 1483-84 (1985).
84. But cf Orfield, supra note 6, at 573 (stating that the general purpose of the Con-
stitution cannot be precisely ascertained).
85. Consider the problem of whether to hire an otherwise qualified babysitter who
sincerely professes utterly to be unable to appreciate any of the purposes underlying any
instructions for the evening. It is unlikely we would view the babysitter's attempt to
ascertain the purposes underlying his or her instructions as introducing "extra-documen-
tary values" in any pejorative sense. Cf Brest, supra note 63, at 761 (commenting on the
role of extra-documentary values in the context of constitutional interpretation).
86. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 827, 851 (1988).
87. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. The preamble to the Constitution reads:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America.
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consciously aware of a particular purpose at any particular time, or
that all framers entertained the same purposes, or that the framers'
purposes normatively must control our own. Nor does this suggest
that the preamble itself creates such a binding legal right that no
amendment contrary to any purposes expressed in the preamble
ever be adopted.90 The existence of the preamble at a minimum,
however, constitutes evidence that the Constitution is purpose-
driven, in the distinct sense of reasonably seeking to promote the
perceived goals or interests of some set of persons. 9'
The crucial remaining step in this argument is that the reason-
ably identifiable purposes of the Constitution, whether embodied in
the text of the preamble, or inferred from other sources, are by
their nature subject to frustration. This is no more mysterious
than the idea of some supervening event frustrating the purposes
underlying an ordinary contract,92 such that the contract becomes
senseless. Similarly, no reason exists to suppose that one or more
of the purposes underlying the Constitution can be frustrated only
by some extrinsic event, such as an environmental catastrophe or
military defeat, and not by a more directly related event, such as
the enactment of a putative amendment that impeaches so much of
the remainder of the Constitution as to require a choice between
starting afresh, with a new constitution, 93 or ignoring the putative
amendment.
The conclusion that there must be implied substantive limits on
the scope of constitutional amendments is resisted on a number of
further grounds quite apart from the unpopularity of natural law
U.S. CONST. preamble.
90. For recognitions of the non-binding status of the preamble, see Jacobson v. Mas-
sachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905); Orfield, supra note 6, at 573. See also IA N. SINGER,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 20.03, at 81 (Sands 4th ed. 1985 rev.)
(statutory preamble is not conclusive, but is entitled to weight, in ascertaining statutory
purpose).
91. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833) ("The consti-
tution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for
themselves .... ).
92. See A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1355, at 1133 (1952) ("Hamlet would
not be Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark."); see also 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 265 comment a (1981) (for discharge of a contractual obligation through
supervening frustration, the frustrated aim "must be so completely the basis of the con-
tract that, as both parties understand, without it the transaction would make little
sense").
93. It is perhaps ironic, but not a defect in this approach, that a society may choose to
require, for example, a three-fourths vote merely to amend a constitution, but to enact an
entirely new constitution upon the vote of a bare majority. This possibility is inherent in
the process of constitution-making generally.
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thinking.94 Importantly, it may be thought that the Constitution
does not have any detectable "spirit" or "essence," and that no
amendment, therefore, can be impliedly unconstitutional because it
allegedly violates that "spirit" or "essence." 95 What is interesting
about this argument is that the premise under this Article's theory
is true, but the conclusion does not follow.
Arguably, there is no determinate essence or spirit of the Consti-
tution in the sense that there is no single clause or purpose which,
if changed, would necessarily destroy the continuity of identity of
the Constitution. Although a play cannot be Hamlet without the
Prince of Denmark,96 it probably is impossible to point to any sin-
gle relatively narrow clause or determinate purpose underlying the
Constitution and characterize it as indispensable. This is the les-
son of the generally, but not completely, unsuccessful attempts to
establish, for example, states' rights,97 human dignity, 9 or free
speech, 99 as independent and sufficient sources of implied substan-
tive limits on constitutional amendments.
Under this argument, there is no essence of the Constitution,
despite its being a purposive document. Although this may be sur-
prising, ample support for similar conclusions exists in modem
philosophy. Ludwig Wittgenstein, in particular, expressed the
view that even institutions with recognizable purposes need not
have essences.100 As demonstrated, however, we cannot infer that
94. Professor Orfield's declaration that "[t]he Constitution does not recognize any
such type of law as Natural Law, or the Law of God, or the Law of Reason" accords well
with the contemporary mainstream. Orfield, supra note 6, at 584. For the current un-
popularity of any alleged "unwritten" restriction on the scope of constitutional amend-
ments, including those based on tradition or natural law, see Grey, Constitutionalism: An
Analytic Framework, in CONSTITUTIONALISM 189, 206 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds.
1979)("It is assumed as a matter of course that the constitutional amendment or enact-
ment process is available to override restrictions laid down in the name of unenacted
constitutional norms.... The claim that a procedurally valid constitutional enactment
cannot take effect because it violates unwritten constitutional law-fundamental tradition
or natural justice-is not generally available as an accepted argument in contemporary
constitutional systems.").
95. For Professor Orfield's rejection of the idea of limitations on amendments based
on some overall "spirit" of the Constitution, see L. ORFIELD, supra note 5, at 106-07.
96. See A. CORBIN, supra note 92, at 1133.
97. See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. But cf. supra notes 52-57 and
accompanying text (noting the arguable unconstitutionality of an amendment not merely
repealing the free speech clause, or significantly restricting freedom of speech, but liter-
ally abolishing speech).
100. See, e.g., J. DANFORD, WITrGENSTEIN AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: A REEX-
AMINATION OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 97-99 (1978)(using the word"game" to illustrate his point that it is different to understand a game's purpose and to
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there can be no implied substantive limits on constitutional amend-
ments because the Constitution has no discrete essence or overrid-
ing spirit.
This result obtains because we cannot discover the true extent of
the implied substantive limitations simply by picking out one or
more provisions or purposes underlying the Constitution, giving
them special status, and announcing that any putative amendment
in conflict with those provisions or purposes in particular must be
unconstitutional. Conversely, we cannot say that no putative
amendment can be unconstitutional if it is not in conflict with
those select, privileged provisions or purposes. In the first case, we
can imagine some serious restrictions on states' rights, free speech,
or particular conceptions of dignity that are not unconstitutional.
In the second case, we can imagine an amendment that, although
not directly impairing one or more selected constitutional provi-
sions or purposes, nonetheless so undermines the remaining provi-
sions and purposes that only a fragmentary, useless, incoherent,
structurally incomplete residue of the Constitution remains.
Thus, Professor Lester Orfield is technically correct to say that
the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment "may be repealed
just as any other amendment[s] and are no more sacred from a
legal standpoint than any other part of the Constitution."' 0' Pro-
fessor Orfield's error, however, lies in concluding that only some
unacceptable natural law doctrine could block the conclusion that
anything at all could take the place of the Bill of Rights or the
fourteenth amendment as long as that replacement was enacted in
a procedurally proper way.
Other objections to the approach developed herein, of course,
can still be raised. One obvious objection amounts to an expressio
unius argument.1"2 The framers, under this argument, expressly
specified in the text of article V a limited number of substantive
restrictions on subsequent constitutional amendments. Had the
find an essence common to all games); A. GRAYLING, WITTGENSTEIN 72 (1988)(lan-
guage, for example, "has no single essence which can be unearthed and stated in terms of
unitary theory"); Phillips, Wittgenstein's Full Stop, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF WITrGENSTEIN 180-81 (I. Block ed. 1981); H. PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND
JUSTICE 63-64 (1972) (Wittgenstein on the meaning of the word 'game' as not amounting
to some single characteristic identifying feature shared by all games); L. WITTGENSTEIN,
THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS 20 (1958) ("[i]f one asks what the different processes of
expecting someone to tea have in common, the answer is that there is no single feature in
common to all of them").
101. L. ORFIELD, supra note 5, at 99.
102. "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius," or "expression of one thing is the exclu-
sion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
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framers intended broader substantive restrictions on the amend-
ment power, they could have built those restrictions explicitly into
the text of the Constitution. As they did not, no such intent or
approval legitimately is inferred."°3
The framers surely could have inserted an express disclaimer of
any implied restrictions, but they did not. The most important re-
sponse to this objection is that it would have been redundant and
pointless for the framers to have incorporated anything like this
Article's approach explicitly into the text. It may make perfect
sense to infer from the fact that a shopping list refers to bread and
milk, but not to coffee, that coffee is not wanted. But the implied
substantive restriction argument advanced here is simply not a gro-
cery list item. To simplify that substantive restriction, one might
formulate it in the following terms: no 'amendment' can be valid if
it leaves what it purports to amend as a smoldering, meaningless
wreckage; rather, such an 'amendment' can only be enacted as part
of a new constitution with which it is organically compatible.
There would be little point to this language. Something parallel to
it necessarily is implied by any complex, purposive document.
There is simply no point to a "don't utterly defeat the purposes of
this document" clause, because such a limitation is inherently,
necessarily implied by undertaking the voluntary act of agreeing to
further certain purposes through the document.
This, however, does not exhaust the possible objections to this
Article's approach. Professor Orfield argued, for example, that
amending the Constitution in horrifying ways and, by extension,
amending it into an incoherent wreckage is merely an "abuse" of
the power to amend the Constitution."o That the power to amend
conceivably might be abused in this fashion does not mean that the
legal power to amend the Constitution abusively does not exist. 0 5
Quite the opposite is true. This objection misconceives our ap-
proach, however. The sorts of implied substantive restrictions ar-
gued for in this Article are not so normative in character. The
putative amendments invalidated under this Article's approach are
not invalidated because they are morally objectionable to anyone,
or evil, or harmful. Rather, these amendments cannot be valid be-
cause they undermine the only recognizable meanings of that with
which they purport to fit-the remainder of the Constitution.
Professor Orfield further raises the interesting, if somewhat met-
103. See L. ORFIELD, supra note 5, at 115-16; Orfield, supra note 6, at 554-55.
104. See L. ORFIELD, supra note 5, at 122-23.
105. See id. at 123.
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aphysical, objection that "[i]t seems natural that somewhere there
resides within the nation the power to do anything, and logically
this authority resides in the amending body."° 6 Thus, in Professor
Orfield's argument, the amending body logically must have the
power to do anything it wants without constraint. This argument
is unsuccessful as well, for reasons similar to those discussed imme-
diately above regarding the problem of "abuse" of the amending
power. Again, the approach is not essentially normative, but logi-
cal. Even if the premises of Professor Orfield's argument are con-
ceded, we must still ask what the power to do "anything" includes.
The amending body may have the power to repeal nearly every
constitutional provision. But it does not, as a matter of logic, have
the power to do both X and not-X at the same time. An amending
body simply does not logically have the power to enact an amend-
ment that is both compatible with and not compatible with the
remainder of the Constitution.
Finally, it certainly is possible to seize in particular on the
Wittgensteinian 0 7 fuzziness of our approach and demand to know
who will be the final arbiter of whether a particular amendment so
deeply and inescapably jeopardizes so much of the remainder of
the Constitution and its several basic purposes as to cast doubt on
the constitutionality of the amendment itself. Why should the fed-
eral courts be entrusted with such a determination, when the peo-
ple and their representatives have by enacting the amendment
presumably just spoken in super-majoritarian fashion? Shouldn't
the legitimacy of such an amendment be regarded as the clearest
possible example of a political question?' 08
In response, the author has no objection in principle to regarding
the entire issue of implied substantive limits on constitutional
amendments as a political question. Political questions often in-
volve a reluctance by courts to intrude into the proper sphere of
other branches of government. 109 Still, in a way not directly impli-
cated by this Article's proposed limitations on constitutional
amendments, other dimensions of the political question problem
are present. For example, there is arguably at least "a lack of judi-
106. Id. at 124.
107. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
108. Cf L. ORFIELD, supra note 5, at 126 (stating that this view may be justified, but
opining that there are really no implied limitations on the amending power); Orfield,
supra note 6, at 23. Vile, supra note 24, at 382 ("[t]o empower the courts to void amend-
ments overturning judicial decisions would surely threaten the notion of a government
founded on the consent of the governed").
109. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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cially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving""' 0
what sorts of amendments are impliedly unconstitutional, or a
need for "an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion.""' Thus, arguably sound reasons exist for not
permitting the courts to intervene to determine whether any given
amendment is impliedly unconstitutional on substantive grounds.
This concession, of course, goes merely to remedy and leaves ut-
terly untouched the argument developed throughout this Article.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article shows that an inescapably vague range of proposed
amendments to the Constitution are in fact unconstitutional, or in-
compatible with the assumed remainder of the Constitution, on
substantive as opposed to procedural grounds. This conclusion is
itself unusual enough in the modem era. What is particularly
noteworthy, however, is that this conclusion is reached without
any reliance on natural law, excessive devotion to the views of our
ancestors, or any assumption that the Constitution has some dis-
crete essence or overriding "spirit."
At some point, an alleged "amendment" so undermines the re-
mainder of the Constitution with which it is alleged to be compati-
ble that it is no longer possible to pretend that such compatibility
genuinely exists, just as at some point in the organ or tissue trans-
plant process, the rejection process has become so extensive, com-
plete, and irreversible that it becomes misleading to refer to the
unsuccessfully transplanted tissue as a transplant in any substan-
tive sense. At that point, for reasons of logic rather than morality,
the "amendment" cannot reasonably be regarded as in fact a genu-
ine amendment to the Constitution, but rather as the genesis of a
new and separate constitution.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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